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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
The Appellate Division would have denied the petitioner relief because
he had not exhausted his administrative remedy by applying for a variance,
as well as on the constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeals, however,
denied the exhaustion ground, but agreed on the constitutional question.7 °
A classification made by a proper zoning agency is a legislative judgment
to which a presumption of validity attaches. Therefore, a party attacking such
a determination has the burden of showing that that classification was invalid.
The nature of this presumption is such that if the validity of the classification
is even fairly debatable it will still stand.7 ' The property here in question
consisted of rolling, partly wooded land in an attractive rural-residential community. Evidence presented by the petitioner admitted that the reasonableness
of the regulation was debatable, and this admission coupled with the nature
of the area and the property in question caused the Court to hold that
petitioner had not made a sufficient showing to overcome the presumption of
validity.72
Petitioner had subdivided his 127 acres of property into one acre plots and
claimed that the amended zoning regulation caused a depreciation in the
value of his property and that it thus constituted an uncompensated taking.
It has, however, been held that the mere lessening of property value by a
classification of this nature does not make that classification unconstitutional.7 3
In fact, a classification is not unconstitutional on this ground unless the property can no longer be used for any purpose to which it is adaptedV4 Both the
Referee and the Appellate Division in the instant case found that under the
two acre limit the property could still be used for purposes to which it was
adapted. Thus, petitioner failed to show that the amendment of the Sands
Point zoning regulations was an invalid exercise of the power granted to the
trustees.
VALIDITY OF ELECTION LAW PRovIsION ON ELIGIBILITY TO NOMINATE

Article 1 Section 1 of the New York Constitution states that "No member
of this state shall be disfranchised, . . . unless by the law of the -land, or the
judgment of his peers." The courts have interpreted this provision to include
70. Concerning the exhaustion of remedies the Court indicated that petitioner was
not seeking relaxation of the ordinance but determination of its constitutionality and for
that reason a variance had no bearing. In addition, a previous case had held that
the Board had no power to grant the relief requested under the guise of a variance.
See Levy v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 267 N.Y. 347, 196 N.E. 284 (1935).

71. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 67; Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles,
300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).
72. A number of cases have held similar zoning classifications constitutional as they
related to rural-residential communities. Dillard v. North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1950) two acres; Flora Realty and Investment Co. v. Ladue, 262 Mo.
1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, appeal dismissed 344 U.S. 802 (1952) three acres; Senior v. Zoning
Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959) four acres; Fischer v.
Tp. of Bedminster, 11 NJ. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) five acres.
73. Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
74. Averne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938); Osborn
v. East Hampton, - Misc. -, 61 N.Y.S.2d 142, aff'd 271 App. Div. 837, 66 N.Y.S.2d
646 (2d Dep't 1925).
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not only the right to vote, but also the right to participate in the nomination
of candidates.75 Section 138 subdivision 6 of the New York Election Law is
possibly in conflict with the above Constitutional provision as interpreted, in
that it provides that the signatures of persons signing an independent nominating petition will not be counted unless those persons were registered as qualified
voters at the last preceding general election. The validity of this statute was
attacked on two grounds in Davis v. Board of Elections of the City of New
York.j' The petitioner contended that the statute was arbitrary and unreasonable as to voters who had become eligible to vote since the last general election
and also as to the signatories in question who had been eligible to vote at
that time but had failed to register.
The petitioner's contention concerning first voters was not answered by
the Court's per curiarn opinion because there was no showing that any of the
persons who had signed -the petition had become eligible to vote since the
last election.
The contention that the statute was an arbitrary disfranchisement in
regard to the signatories in question was dismissed because the petitioner
failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attaching to the legislative
enactment' 7 In addition, the Court indicated that certain duties as well as
rights attach to the franchise to vote, and because the signatories had failed to
exercise the franchise in the previous election, the petitioner was estopped from
raising the reasonableness of the statute.
Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissent, would have invalidated the entire
statutory provision because of the "discrimination" against first voters. The
Appellate Division opinion' which was affirmed by the Court, had held the
requirements discriminatory as to first voters, but not so where the signatories,
as here, had been negligible to vote. This question of the effect toward first
voters remains unanswered by the Court of Appeals. It is probable that the
provision will be upheld as to first voters as this case has held concerning those
who failed to exercise their franchise. The requirements of the statute can be
justified as reasonable in light of the administrative problem present. 70
STATE REGULATION OF UNION OFFICIALS

In DeVeau v. Braisted,80 a union official sought a judgment declaring
Section 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act 8l unconstitutional, as being in
conflict with Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 82 and also
contending that he was not convicted of a felony within the meaning of Sec75.
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77.
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82.
ployees

Hopper v. Britt, 204 N.Y. 524, 98 N.E. 86 (1912).
5 N.Y.2d 66, 179 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1958).
Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
6 A.D.2d 390, 178 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1958).
See e.g., Ahern v. Elder, 195 N.Y. 493, 88 N.E. 1059 (1909).
5 N.Y.2d 236, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959).
N.Y. Sass. LAws 1953 c. 887.

(TAFT-HARmEY Acr), 61 Stat. 163 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952); giving emthe right to bargain through representatives of their own choosing.

86

